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In the mid to late 1980’s, as NASA was studying ways to improve weather forecasting 
capabilities to reduce excessive weather launch delays and to reduce excessive weather Launch 
Commit Criteria (LCC) waivers, the Challenger Accident occurred and the AC-67 Mishap 
occurred.[1]  NASA and USAF weather personnel had advance knowledge of extremely high 
levels of weather hazards that ultimately caused or contributed to both of these accidents.  In 
both cases, key knowledge of the risks posed by violations of weather LCC was not in the 
possession of final decision makers on the launch teams.  In addition to convening the mishap 
boards for these two lost missions, NASA convened expert meteorological boards focusing on 
weather support.  These meteorological boards recommended the development of a dedicated 
organization with the highest levels of weather expertise and influence to support all of 
American spaceflight.  NASA immediately established the Weather Support Office (WSO) in 
the Office of Space Flight (OSF), and in coordination with the United Stated Air Force (USAF), 
initiated an overhaul of the organization and an improvement in technology used for weather 
support as recommended.  Soon after, the USAF established a senior civilian Launch Weather 
Officer (LWO) position to provide meteorological support and continuity of weather expertise 
and knowledge over time.  The Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) was established by NASA, 
USAF, and the National Weather Service to support initiatives to place new tools and methods 
into an operational status.  At the end of the Shuttle Program, after several weather office 
reorganizations, the WSO function had been assigned to a weather branch at Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC).  This branch was dismantled in steps due to further reorganization, loss of key 
personnel, and loss of budget line authority.  NASA is facing the loss of sufficient expertise and 
leadership required to provide current levels of weather support.   The recommendation 
proposed herein is to re-establish the WSO under a high level office, with funding set at about 
the same levels as today, with a revitalized charter and focus to allow for the WSO to operate as 







The primary weather hazards to launch are low level winds, upper level winds, precipitation, 
temperature, natural lightning, and triggered lightning.  In the absence of detailed knowledge of the 
level of hazards present, space flight weather decisions are by necessity conservative, which can lead 
to lack of launch availability.  Since NASA has been established, it has steadily increased weather 
forecasting capability and has improved weather observational tools in order to increase launch 
weather availability and to maintain launch weather safety.   
In the 1960’s, as NASA launch rates steadily rose, ground instrumentation, local forecasting and 
launch commit criteria were enhanced to ensure the best possible weather support for launch.  By the 
time of the Apollo XII launch in 1969, NASA and the USAF had installed natural lightning detectors 
and multiple weather stations on KSC and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) property in 
order to avoid weather hazards while maintaining launch availability.  After the Apollo XII launch 
vehicle triggered lightning on launch (1969), corrective actions were taken in February 1970 to add 
new Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) to prevent recurrence.  These Apollo XII corrective 
actions significantly reduced launch availability in order to increase flight safety. 
With the introduction of the Space Shuttle, more formally named the National Space Transportation 
System (NSTS), NASA had a flagship vehicle with extreme sensitivity to weather.  By the mid-1980’s, 
the Shuttle launch team was processing on average two waivers to weather requirements for each 
launch, and was still experiencing a high weather-related launch delay rate.  The weather 
observation instrumentation and LLCC for NSTS were upgraded as new technology became mature. 
In the same time period, the Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) community continued to rely on the 
initial LLCC developed immediately after Apollo XII.  Atlas Centaur (AC) 38 (likely struck by 
triggered lightning) illustrates a close call with the near catastrophic consequences (later realized in 
the destruction of AC-67) that can result from using faulty LLCC or faulty implementation 
procedures.[2]   
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In the fall of 1985, the OSF at NASA HQ established a Space Shuttle Weather Advisory Panel 
(chaired by John Theon) to review the weather support program and to develop recommendations to 
improve launch weather support coverage.  The panel met for the first time in December 1985.   
In January 1986, the Challenger accident occurred, with the main cause determined to be the failure 
of a Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) joint, caused in part by the very low temperatures experienced before 
blast-off and the consequent deterioration of the performance of the seal used in the joint.[3, 4]  It has 
been argued that upper-wind conditions at launch time were a significant factor in the accident, in 
that severe turbulence may well have reopened a transient SRB metal seal.[3, 4]  Upper wind 
conditions at KSC had been analyzed preceding to and at the time of launch showing that severely 
turbulent conditions were probable and that the conventional wind sounding system was inadequate 
for satisfactorily establishing the launch wind conditions.[3, 4]   
In October 1986, the Theon Report was provided to the OSF.  In that same month, responding to the 
Rogers Commission Report release in July 1986, the OSF sought the advice of the National Research 
Council (NRC) on how to ensure space flight weather support services were brought up to the “very 
state-of-the-art science and technology and are under an optimal management situation”.[1] 
In March 1987, AC-67 was launched into inclement weather conditions, in violation of Apollo era 
LLCC (older than the updated NSTS LLCC), and triggered a lightning strike to the vehicle which 
resulted in its total destruction.  In August 1987, the Report of Atlas/Centaur-67 FLTSATCOM F-6 
Investigation Board was released. 
In August 1988, the NRC Report (Meteorological Support for Space Operations:  Review and 
Recommendations) was released. 
NASA and the USAF implemented the recommendations of these three reports pertinent to launch 
weather, and as a direct result there have been no weather induced launch failures in over 30 years.   
 The Theon Report [5] 
 The AC-67 Mishap Investigation Board Report [6] 
 The NRC Report [1] 
Only one of these reports was released strictly to reduce the likelihood of a mishap.  The Theon 
Report and the NRC Report were focused on finding ways to increase knowledge and to improve 
decision making.  Consequently, post AC-67, given similar weather conditions, NASA and USAF have 
increased launch weather safety while simultaneously improving launch availability.   
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The weather-related deficiencies and associated recommendations from these reports can be said to 
fall into five broad categories that were identified within the NRC report.  Rephrased from the NRC 
report, here are the five major organizing functions of the modern weather support for space launch: 
1. Quantification of weather hazards (creating data sets) 
2. Observation system development and utilization (improving instrumentation) 
3. Analysis, forecasting, and decision making 
4. Organization and coordination of operations and research 
5. Applied research, advancement in forecast tools and techniques 
NASA and the USAF responded to the recommendations energetically.  As a result, 
from 1987 onward, the weather support capability for American spaceflight improved 
in a spirit of collaboration between both American space programs.   
In the late 1980s, the WSO was staffed by two senior NASA civilians and a senior 
military liaison officer from the USAF. Although the formal title was the Space Shuttle 
Headquarters Support Office/Weather Office, it was generally known as the Weather 
Support Office (WSO). 
In the 1990’s, both KSC and CCAFS were updated with an operational suite of 
specialized instrumentation systems and specialized local real time forecast tools to 
provide weather support for launch superior to any other location in the world.  Over 
time, LCC have been revised in ways that would not have been possible without the 
upgrades and improvements made upon the recommendation of the meteorological 
board reports made in the late 1980’s.  
As part of a NASA cost-cutting reorganization in 1995, the agency-wide responsibility 
for weather support to the Shuttle program was transferred from the NASA 
Headquarters Weather Office, which was abolished, to the KSC Weather Office.  The 
KSC Weather Office (KWO) assumed the WSO agency-wide responsibility to assure 
that weather support to NASA spaceflight missions and operations, manned or 
unmanned, was adequate.  
As the shuttle program ended and NASA began to transition to the post-Shuttle era, 
the NASA wide influence of the KWO began to wane based on KSC local budgetary 
decisions.  The autonomy previously established within the NSTS budget became 
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subject to available funding streams obtained from KSC resident programs that 
previously had not been responsible to fund weather support. 
The KSC Weather Office Chief retired and the KSC Weather Officer passed away in 
2014.  The KWO was reorganized along with the rest of the center, and due to budget 
cuts, the remaining three NASA weather office employees were required to assume 
duties previously performed by contractors to support the AMU.  The office was 
disbanded and employees were assigned to a branch in the Spaceport Integration 
Directorate.  At the beginning of 2017, the acting KSC Weather Officer retired.   
As of October 2017, there are two full time NASA workers in the branch performing 
technical weather support duties and providing direct launch support.  The weather 
budget authority and the weather staff’s ability to influence weather support decisions 
are reduced with every budget cycle.   
With the loss of the key WSO function, one of the five major organizing functions of 
weather support, “4.  Organization and coordination of operations and research”, can be 
considered as lapsed.  The funding and the support for the other four weather support 
organizing functions are threatened due to the lack of an influential WSO to defend the 
utility of the capabilities. 
The weather support organizing function to provide “5. Applied research, advancement 
in forecast tools and techniques”, is embodied in the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU).  
The AMU functions as a development test bed, but is not fully recognized within NASA 
as a key sustaining tool required to support all tailored local forecasts used by the 
operational USAF 45th Space Wing (45SW) Weather Squadron for all Eastern Test 
Range (ETR) launches.  The operational local forecast tools also threatened by the loss 
of funding for the maintenance of the NASA data archive server and for NASA-
provided data feeds of synoptic forecasts provided to the LWO.  The NASA funding for 
the USAF 45SW Launch and Test Range System Integrated Support Contract (LISC) 
tasked with maintaining instrumentation on CCAFS and KSC is threatened with 
elimination.  The current state of the implemented recommendations from the Agency 
meteorological boards that serve as the organizing functions for modern launch 
weather support follows: 
1. Quantification of weather hazards (Budget threatened) 
2. Observation system development and utilization (Budget threatened) 
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3. Analysis, forecasting, and decision making (Budget threatened) 
4. Organization and coordination of operations and research (Lapsed) 
5. Applied research, advancement in forecast tools and techniques (Budget threatened) 
As far as forecast tools and observational tools and expert civilian forecast teams, 
weather support for launch is at an all-time high.  However, with the loss of the WSO, 
NASA weather has diverged from the primary recommendation of the Theon Report:   
“The Panel’s first and strongest recommendation was that the Shuttle weather 
support services must be organized in such a way as to bring them up to the 
very state of the science and technology and are under an optimal management 
situation.  Although equipment and software capabilities are important, the 
Panel felt that technical leadership, a competent and dedicated staff, their 
commitment to a long term of service to the NSTS team, and their visibility in 
the decision-making process were much more important considerations.”[5] 
(Emphasis added) 
With loss of control of the weather support budget, funding support for NASA 
instrumentation is immediately threatened and funding support for the USAF 45SW 
LISC contract is expected to be withdrawn in the next few years.  In 2019, with the 
anticipated retirement of one of the two NASA weather office workers, the 
organizational weather support framework will be reduced to levels far lower than 
those observed prior to when the Theon and NRC reports were issued, and NASA 
weather will see a further break in continuity.  NASA KSC will lose the ability to 
sustain operational tools and there will be a subsequent reduction of availability of 
current tools used by the LWO and staff.  Unless the USAF can develop new tools and 
data acquisition to replace the tools sustained by the AMU today, the LWO will see a 











 Modern Launch Weather Support 
Following is a history of the implementation of the meteorological board recommendations, rephrased 
and condensed.  These are categorized along the lines of the recommendations identified by the NRC 
report: (*indicates capability has lapsed) 
1. Quantification of weather hazards 
a. Enhanced techniques utilizing lightning detection systems, field mill networks, radar, 
satellite data, evolved into the lightning assessment process used to issue Lightning 
Warnings (Phase I and Phase II).  The approach reduces lightning weather downtime for 
ground ops by 50% saving several million dollars in lost productivity.  KDP-KSC-P-3005 
documents the KSC and CCAFS unique adverse weather policy. 
b. Jimsphere pair database has been improved dramatically using the Tropospheric Doppler 
Radar Wind Profiler (TDRWP), databases have been developed at all ranges 
c. Establishment of Data Archives.  These are used in local forecast models 
d. Triggered lightning studies were performed over years, and the LLCC has been changed to 
reflect quantification of hazards for different cloud types and weather conditions 
2. Observation system development and utilization 
a. USAF 915 MHz wind profilers are operational 
b. Radar:  USAF WSR-74C was acquired by the Eastern Range in 1984 – Replaced by WSR-
43/250 in 2009 
c. TDRWP is operational.  (AC-205 in 2003 would have been lost without TDRWP)  After 
STS-58, TDRWP was used to create a “range reference atmosphere” to accurately depict 
probabilities of wind shears, increasing launch availability 
d. Airborne instrumentation is required per LLCC with “severe clear” weather exceptions 
e. Ground Base Field Mill System is operational at ETR - Not at Western Test Range (WTR) 
f. Lightning Detection and Ranging System is operational (replaced by MERLIN 2016) 
g. Jimsphere pair databases provide knockdown winds with much greater precision, 
especially with the use of TDRWP.   
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h. AMU established to allow for deployment of new instrumentation and techniques which 
cannot be deployed directly into operational systems and processes 
i. Satellite data feeds incorporated into local forecasts 
j. *Weather Buoys established in coordination with National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) and 
the National Weather Service (NWS) 
3. Analysis, forecasting, and decision making 
a. Meteorological Interactive Data Display System (MIDDS) is maintained and upgraded at 
ETR, companion system at WTR.  Displays incorporate all data sets from all sources 
b. MIDDS is monitored by computer as well as the LWO and staff 
c. Use of synoptic and mesoscale models are used to provide guidance to forecast team, via 
the AMU derived locally tuned Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model 
d. Across agency, launch rules and rationale are precise and accurate 
e. Launch team training is extensive for USAF 45 SW Weather Squadron 
f. Decision trees and computer aided decision making informs LWO and staff 
g. LLCC are a set of complex rules used to avoid natural and rocket triggered lightning.  
NASA-STD-4010 (NASA Standard for Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for Space Flight) 
is in NASA agency signature, all agencies and ranges will use, required to be rigorously 
met [7, 8, 9, 10]  
h. Range LCC include boundary layer profiles of wind, temperature and moisture that are 
primarily used for predicting transport and dispersion of atmospheric constituents 
i. User LCC are limits for various weather categories such as near surface winds so the 
rocket can safely clear the launch tower, temperature for mechanical integrity of the 
rocket, and precipitation to avoid damaging the rocket while in-flight. Requirements also 
exist for upper level winds to avoid over stressing the space launch vehicle as it counter-
steers through the actual winds versus the planned winds to stay on the correct trajectory 
and achieve the desired orbit. User LCC varies between launch vehicle programs and 
different configurations of vehicles in the same program. [11] 
j. NASA and other participants in space launches have shared roles in developing numerical 
models in dealing with weather elements crucial to the space program, through AMU and 
the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) 
k. NASA and other participants have developed the Lightning Protection and Analysis group 
to investigate observed lightning strikes near sensitive equipment, rockets and payloads to 
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assess damages on a rapid response basis in order to avoid launch and processing delays 
and to ascertain if there is a need to perform further investigation for lightning damage 
l. Comparisons between ETR and WTR has been conducted and criteria match 
m. *Comparisons between NSTS (now Space Launch System) with ELV (now Launch Services 
Program) are known.  One major difference is that SLS requires TDRWP, LSP does not. 
4. Organization and coordination of operations and research  
a. *Weather Support Office (WSO) established in 1987 
b. Team of expert civilian forecasters established within USAF CCAFS Weather Squadron 
c. Senior USAF civilian expert position established, senior USAF LWO 
d. *WSO director assigned with clear authority within Shuttle Program 
e. *Budget authority provided to WSO to ensure integrated and coordinated weather support 
across all manned and unmanned space programs 
f. *WSO obtained a budget and exercised line item authority to support and direct applied 
research efforts needed to solve operational problems 
g. *All meteorological support teams recognized WSO as having responsibility to direct, 
coordinate and supervise weather operation activities and research activities in support of 
all manned and unmanned space programs 
h. *WSO director periodically assessed whether or not (1) weather observations and observers 
meet the needs of the space program, (2) conducted thorough inspections to determine if 
observing systems are properly configured, calibrated and maintained, (3) ascertained 
whether or not available resources are being fully used to support space flight and (4) took 
actions to correct any problems identified 
i. *WSO staffed with atmospheric scientist capable of evaluating applied research activities, 
stimulating new applied research efforts to meet unaddressed needs of the space program.  
Skillsets required are meteorology, data modelling, software development, statistics 
j. WSO developed a weather support advisory committee to periodically assess for the WSO 
the organizational and technical issues that affect support for NASA space operations 
5. Applied research, advancement in forecast (AARF) tools, techniques and technology 
a. AMU was established in accordance with NRC report section 5 
b. Lightning Advisory Panel was established in 1992 after Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC), KSC and USAF agreed the LLCC needed a panel of experts to provide 
authoritative control 
c. Standing advisory panels of experts support both the AMU and the LAP and the LPA. 
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d. Less restrictive LLCC have been established using AMU developed radar scan strategies, 
scientific studies, and instrumentation.  For example, the revised 1998 revision to LLLCC 
was subjectively estimated to decrease in the LLCC driven scrub rate by about 25% 
e. AMU is co-located with 45SW Weather Squadron staff in Morrell Operations Center 
f. AMU is used as the technology test bed for new forecast and visualization tools used by the  
LWO and staff 
g. AMU developed and sustains these operational AMU tools for 45SW Weather Squadron 
use: 
i. Severe weather tools 
ii. Peak wind tools 
iii. Upper level wind tools – requires access to KSC Weather Data Archive site/server 
iv. Lightning forecast tools 
v. Daily forecast tools 
vi. Launch constraint tools (e.g. anvil tool) 
vii. Tools relating to the effective application of specific systems (e.g. radar scan 
strategy) 



















KSC has strategically moved to become a multi-user spaceport with increasing launch rates.  Being 
located in the subtropics and in the most active lightning region in the United States, the absence of 
robust evaluation of LCC and weather infrastructure will endanger launch missions. Ground 
operations and launch will cumulatively undergo greater delays and scrubs.   
There are three types of requirements the LWO evaluates:  Lightning Launch Commit Criteria, 
Range Launch Commit Criteria, and User Launch Commit Criteria.  However, the only mandatory 
weather instrumentation required for evaluation of these launch commit criteria and launch is the 
weather balloon, because balloon data is always required for the loads and steering programs in the 
guidance system of the rocket.  Other weather infrastructure is required to be operational only if all 
weather LCC requirements are not clearly met based on observations.  The LCC evaluation system is 
intentionally designed this way, so a launch is not required to be scrubbed due to unavailability of the 
full suite of weather infrastructure if the weather is “severe clear”. 
1. LLCC are a set of complex rules used to avoid natural and rocket triggered lightning.  NASA-STD-
4010 is in final NASA agency signature.  All agencies and ranges will use NASA-STD-4010, which 
is required to be rigorously met [7, 8, 9, 10]  
2. Range LCC include boundary layer profiles of wind, temperature and moisture that are primarily 
used for predicting transport and dispersion of atmospheric constituents.  
3. User LCC are limits for various weather categories such as near surface winds so the rocket can 
safely clear the launch tower, temperature for mechanical integrity of the rocket, and precipitation 
to avoid damaging the rocket while in-flight. Requirements also exist for upper level winds to avoid 
over stressing the space launch vehicle as it counter-steers through the actual winds versus the 
planned winds to stay on the correct trajectory and achieve the desired orbit. User LCC varies 




In order to maintain a functional range, and not to simply wait for clear calm days to launch, 
forecasters need ways to find more available days, which requires experience, expertise, advanced 
observation systems, and a variety of analytical and forecast tools.  The LWO needs to be in close 
communication with the launch team and to establish a relationship of trust.  45SW Weather 
Squadron capabilities are partially funded by NASA per the Webb-McNamara Agreement [13] at 
levels considered fair to USAF and NASA in proportion to range use.  It is imperative that NASA 
continue to provide weather support leadership and maintain communication with the USAF in order 
to ensure the USAF civilian staffing approach established by cross agency board recommendations 
persists far into the future. 
A new and growing gap between the NASA recommended approach and the current state has been 
created with the loss of clear authority, the loss of line funding authority, and a loss of a high level 
advocate to defend existing weather support capabilities.   
The last KSC Weather Officer retired in January 2017, and that position was not backfilled.  There is 
a current opportunity to revise the staffing approach to establish a new NASA Agency WSO Director 
instead of backfilling the KSC Weather Officer position.  The new WSO should review the status of 
staffing at other center weather support offices to ensure the post-Shuttle weather support across the 










The dedicated funding for weather support from Human Operations and Exploration Mission 
Directorate (HEO) ended with the end of the Space Shuttle Program, leaving the KWO with a 
reduced budget drawn from within individual KSC located programs.   
All KSC located launch programs, except for the tri-program, essentially buy launch services for 
payloads.  Due to the USAF 45SW implementation of agreements covered by Commercial Space 
Launch Act (CSLA) legislation, the USAF does not charge for indirect weather support services from 
CSLA customers.  Launch service providers fund only a small fraction of launch weather support via 
their agreements with USAF and NASA.  Payload customers do not reimburse weather 
infrastructure costs when they procure launch service contracts.   
The KSC Chief Financial Officer (CFO) made extraordinary efforts from 2015-2017 to assess NASA 
KSC resident program customers and the KSC Center Management and Operations office to pay for a 
level of weather support that meets basic launch and ground operations requirements.  The KSC 
CFO is also developing reimbursement strategies for commercial launch providers in order to obtain 
an increased share of funding from commercial launch providers.  It has proven difficult to develop a 
requirements-based reimbursement scheme, because some launches under clear weather conditions 
will not require the total suite of instrumentation and analysis. 
The KSC resident launching programs, while they are among the chief ultimate beneficiaries of the 
increased flight safety provided by the advanced meteorological support of launch, are not 
individually chartered to support weather infrastructure, nor is the multi-program assessment an 
effective means to support a lean weather office. 
As the weather professionals who were involved in the Challenger and AC-67 mishaps retire, there is 
a loss of corporate knowledge regarding previous accident investigations and lessons learned.  
Funding requirements need to be identified for smooth transition of personnel into leadership roles 
and to support long term sustainment for weather infrastructure.   
If NASA does not re-establish a firmly funded WSO with a focused mission and line budget, then 
steps need to be taken to coordinate within NASA and other agencies to revisit past agreements and 
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to ensure weather support does not degrade.  The other option would be for NASA to work with 
USAF to quantify and accept the risk of maintaining the status quo and accepting lower levels of 











Ancillary Problems  
  
KSC and CCAFS have state-of-the-art instrumentation systems (i.e., radar, lightning detection 
systems, a ground based field mill network, an array of weather towers), and sophisticated 
forecasting methods and displays to predict and warn against weather hazards in support of ground 
operations not directly associated with launch.  If these meteorological systems and tools are not 
maintained, Phase II warning periods are likely to double.  This increase is attributable to systems 
degradation leading to decreased detection, accuracy, and/or detection efficiency. Phase II lightning 
warnings account for approximately 150 hours per year and Phase I lightning warnings account for 
approximately 450 hours per year at any point on KSC.[12]  On average, operations suspended 
during Phase II are experiencing about a 30 minute opportunity loss each day, which increases to 60 
minutes if KSC and CCAFS meteorological systems are allowed to degrade.    
The funding for the Lightning Protection and Analysis group is small, on-demand and threatened.  If 
that funding is cut, NASA will see a loss of capability to rapidly respond to observed lightning 
strikes.  As an example of downtime that occurred when the 24/7 lightning strike alerts were not 
available, the STS-115 launch countdown operations start was delayed by several days due to lack of 
information that lightning had occurred late on a Friday and retest was required prior to start.  Had 
the lightning strike been identified automatically, the launch team would have had the option to 
retest over the weekend.   
The USAF 45SW Weather Squadron uses specialized local forecast models which require data feeds 
from synoptic and mesoscale forecast models from outside of USAF and NASA.  The firewall 
requirements for USAF information technology networks prohibit USAF 45 SW Weather Squadron 
from making direct access to the forecast websites required, so NASA has established mirror sites 
within the NASA firewall to allow for the forecast models to be imported for use by the USAF.  
Without these synoptic and mesoscale models, the local models will not function properly. 
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The USAF 45SW Weather Squadron uses specialized local forecast models that depend on KSC 
weather data archives to ensure local forecast model functionality.  Without the KSC weather data 
archives, the local models will not function properly. 
The USAF 45SW Weather Squadron uses specialized local forecast models and strategies that are 
products developed by the AMU and sustained by the AMU.  Without the AMU, the USAF will need 
to obtain a way to provide software sustainment for these operational products, or else to replace 
these products.  The USAF 45SW Weather Squadron does not have USAF authority to develop new 
software tools on operational consoles used for weather support.  Without the AMU, the USAF will 
need to obtain a way to provide a technology transfer capability to allow for new technology or 
replacement technology to be transferred into an operational status. 
On a separate note, Launch Services Program (LSP) and the Space Launch System (SLS) Program 
have divergent Range LCC.  The SLS requires an operational TDRWP, and LSP does not consider 
the TDRWP as a requirement.  While this divergence is not necessarily a violation of previous board 
recommendations, the AC-67 mishap board did recommend that the divergence between manned and 
unmanned programs should converge where practical and be examined and the associated risks 
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Call to Action  
 
 
To meet the unusual demands of rocket-operations weather forecasting, to ensure effective 
and safe weather services for processing, launch and landing, and to bring about 
substantial improvements in weather support, it is imperative that NASA give clear and 
unambiguous authority to a Weather Support Office.  The WSO will require sufficient 
budgetary authority to ensure an integrated and coordinated meteorological support 
program for all phases of the manned and unmanned space programs.  Weather support 
for manned and unmanned space flight should be provided as a single cohesive program 
coordinated through the WSO.[14]  The funding for this office should come directly from 
HEO so that NASA KSC internal budget priorities do not threaten weather support for 
the agency and the agreements made with the USAF for joint weather support.  The WSO 
must be tasked to look forward and to ensure funding is sufficient to provide quality 
weather products and services for years to come.  The WSO must work across multiple 
NASA Centers (MSFC, JSC, and Wallops Flight Facility (WFF)) and other government 
agencies (USAF, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)) to ensure weather support is adequate to protect 
the public, the workforce and high value assets.   
If the KSC Weather Officer position is eliminated and the WSO is not re-established, 
NASA will have rescinded corrective actions put in place after serious weather-related 
launch failures.  Further reductions in weather support staff and funding will have a 
direct impact on NASA’s ability to ensure the other weather support improvements 
remain in effect.  Loss of weather support will result in increased exposure to personnel 
and assets and loss of operational and launch availability.   Although the cost of 
maintaining weather support and infrastructure is substantial, it represents only a very 
small fraction of the potential losses that poorly forecast weather conditions can cause 
during rocket launch and recovery operations. [3]  
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The state of the NASA and USAF response to the corrective actions and recommendations 
from the meteorological boards is attached in a color coded spreadsheet indicating which 
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